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The global financial crisis which began with the UnitedStates sub-prime mortgage problems in 2007brought to fore the central and cross-cutting role of
financial sector activities in a nations economic wellbeing.
The crisis appears to vindicate strident calls for financial
sector reforms to enthrone sound financial practices and
good corporate governance as means to ensuring
sustainable economic growth and development.  It is indeed
true that financial sector reforms have been undertaken in
one form or the other in various countries prior to the current
global financial crisis, but the ferocity of the crisis and its
pain on the global community has led many to wonder
what actually went wrong. Many have questioned the
manner and essence of financial reforms, whether they
have gone far enough to have avoided the current global
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crisis or if the problem is with the
manner and spirit of reform
implementation.
In the light of the foregoing, many
policy makers in Nigeria who appeared
caught napping in the belief that
Nigeria’s emerging market status would
significantly moderate the impact of the
crisis on its fortunes, have also begun
to address their minds to the direction
of motion of the banking sector
reforms. This is especially in the
realisation that the oil-income
dependent nature of the Nigerian
economy does not afford it the same
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shock absorption platform as those
of the Chinese and other diversified
emerging market economies. It is
thus appropriate in the current
adverse global economic
circumstances to determine the
direction of the banking sector
reforms. Given that banking reform
is a process rather than an event
(Sere-Ejembi, 2008: 12), it would be
necessary to take a look at the
journey so far in order to determine
the dept and reach of the reform and
how far they have met expectations.
To achieve the foregoing
objectives, section two of the paper
provides a conceptual platform for
understanding the nature of
activities in the financial sector. The
various reasons offered for banking
sector reform in Nigeria are laid out
in section three. Section four
discusses the history and content
of banking sector reforms in Nigeria
prior to 2004, while section five lays
out the nature of the banking reform
in 2004 and beyond. Other sections
are: the costs and benefits of the
reforms (in section six) and Post
consolidation challenges and the
lessons leant (in section seven). The
paper is concluded in section 8 with
a gaze into emerging issues ahead.
Conceptual Framework:
Banking and Other Financial
Sector Activities
What is referred to as the financial
sector comprises financial market
institutions and insurance
companies whose activities are at
the heart of any modern economy.
The financial market consists of
various exchanges, brokerage
houses and financial institutions
which are now connected into what
has in recent years become a global
financial market. The financial
market can be broken into three
segments- money market, capital
market and derivative market (Ryan,
2004: 438-452):
The money markets exist for the
purchase and sale of money in the
form of foreign exchange (FOREX)
and financial securities that have less
than one year until maturity.   Money
market securities are generally
referred to as ‘bills’ such as treasury
bills and certificates, commercial
papers, bankers acceptances,
certificates of deposits, bankers unit
funds, and time and call money
(Ovwielefuoma, 1993: 296).
The capital markets exist for the
purchase and sale of financial claims
which have a term to maturity, when
issued, of greater than one year.  The
capital market is divided into a
number of subordinate markets the
most important being the market for
fixed interest securities (bonds) and
equities.  Within each market there
is a ‘primary market’ where the user
of capital (government, firms or other
institutions) issues securities to the
market to be taken up by either
private or institutional investors and
a secondary market, where issued
securities are subsequently  traded.
Derivatives markets exist for the
purchase and sale of securities
‘derived’ from the value of other
financial securities.  Such derivatives
include swaps, futures and options
upon both capital market and money
market securities.   The derivatives
markets are important for two
reasons:  first they allow investors
to manage the risk associated with
their holdings of securities.  Second,
in perfectly competitive markets, the
prices of the derivative securities
should exist in a clear relationship
to the price of the principal securities
concerned.  This allows us to develop
pricing models both for derivatives
and for their underlying securities
based upon the law of ‘one price’.
It is evident that commercial
banks constitute the most visible
institution in the financial market.
This is due to the very nature of banks
whose failure is viewed to have
greater effect on the economy than
the failure of other types of
businesses (Ogunleye (2005: 3).
Along with the traditional banks, Non-
Financial Institutions (NBFIs) also
play intermediation role in the
financial system by accepting
deposit from surplus units and
lending to deficit units, and through
the buying and selling of securities.
Thus, NBFIs create assets and
liabilities different from banks which
tend to influence the supply of
money and at times precipitate
monetary neutrality (Jhingan 2005:
629).
It should also be recognised that
reforms in the banking industry have
benefited immensely from the
collaborative effort of the regulatory
agencies of other financial sub-
sectors. As noted by Ogunleye
(2005: 8), the need for cooperation
among the regulatory agencies led
to the establishment of the Financial
Services Regulation Coordinating
Committee (FSRCC2). This body
has provided a forum for the financial
system regulators to collaborate and
eliminate regulatory arbitrage, and
consequently enhance the effective
supervision of the financial system.
An important issue then is
whether financial sector reforms
should be left to the regulatory
authority of each sub-sector of the
financial system to pursue, or
whether interventions should be done
in concert with all the regulatory
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agencies working together to
prescribe and implement
complementary policies. It is
evident that a successful financial
sector reform in Nigeria would
require coordinated interventions by
the CBN, SEC, NSE, NAICOM and
PENCOM acting in conjunction with
important agencies like the Nigerian




Over the past five decades, banking
reforms have been articulated as
means to ensuring the stability of
the banking system, deepening of
the entire financial system and,
ultimately, the attainment of
economic growth (Onodje and
Olaniyan: 2008).  Reform policies
in forms of directed recapitalisation,
directed credit and other guidelines
on portfolio composition have been
justified as means to increasing
confidence in the banking system
and broadening access to long-term
credit, especially in the real sector
of the Nigerian economy, where
long-term credit has typically been
scarce. Directed recapitalisation
policies were a quest for local and
global market dominance and
improved stakeholders’ confidence.
Directed credit policies were aimed
at development of vital sectors of
the economy and employment
generation, amongst others.
Guidelines on portfolio composition
appeared to be directed at achieving
efficiency and effectiveness of the
payment system, safety and
soundness, effective supervision,
good corporate governance
amongst others (Sanni: 2007, 70-
75).
The inadequacies of Nigerian
banks identified by the CBN included
low capital base, large number of
small banks with relatively few
ranches, poor rating of some of the
banks, weak corporate governance
including inaccurate reporting and
non-compliance with regulatory
requirements, declining ethics and
huge non-performing insider-related
credits. Others included over-
dependence on public sector
deposits and foreign exchange
trading. The desire to remedy these
inadequacies provided the impetus
for the reforms (Soludo: 2004).
According to Agba and Enofe, 2007:
117-120), banking reform has the
benefits of checking distress,
promoting depositors confidence,
providing better funding for economic
activities, increasing the capacity of
banks to engage in cross-border
businesses, increasing returns to
investors and reducing overall cost
of banking operations. Sere-Ejembi
(2008), equally notes that many saw
the reforms as necessary to bring
about a strong and reliable banking
sector that will ensure safety of
depositors money, play active
developmental roles in the Nigerian
economy and become competent
and competitive players both in the
African and global financial systems.
According to Ogunleye (2005: 2),
the Nigeria banking sector, prior to
the 2004 reform had only made
minimal contributions to the nation’s
economic development, while the
stability of the banking sub-sector
continued to be threatened. He
adduced this to the fact that the
subsisting structure and
capitalisation of the sub-sector had
been inadequate to meet the needs
of the economy, especially, the need
to finance large developmental
projects that the nation critically
required. He saw the system as
largely made up of small banking
firms, which were highly vulnerable
to shocks.
The prevalence of weak small
banks at those times gave room to
other problems identified by
Akingbola (2006: 14-15) as absence
of internally focused management
plans and budgets, myopic
management, prevalence of sole
ownership,  poor credit culture, lax
licensing regime, weak professional
capacity, weak internal controls and
weak judicial system, etc.  Thus, at
the inception of the reform in 2004,
the CBN argued that reforms were
needed to usher in a sound banking
system able to facilitate economic
development, provide a platform for
sound monetary policy implemen-
tation as well as ensure price
stability (Soludo: 2004).  One way
of achieving the stated vision of CBN
and strengthening local banks to
positively impact the real sector and
grow the Nigerian economy is to
allow in foreign banks, as argued by
Onodje and Olaniyan (2008: 10).
They were of the view that financial
reform by way of foreign bank entry
will aid economic competitiveness
benchmark against international
best practices, and increase
international capital inflows. Financial
reforms through foreign bank entry
would generate economic growth by
way of increased pool of funds,
reduced investment risks and
enhanced productivity of investment
projects.
Risk based capital standards have
also been proffered as an effective
means of strengthening banks
against distress and is the basis of
the Basel I and II accords (Arua N.,
2006: 63-68). The standards require
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banks to hold sufficient capital and
reserves to insulate them form
unforeseen losses. Basel I and
Basel II are widely recognised as
international benchmarks that
banks in both developing and
developed countries are required to
comply with. Although, these
standards of supervised capital
adequacy are easier to adopt as
simplified quantitative restrictions,
and the underlying procedures and
the supervisory skills required are
harder to acquire (World Bank:
2001), they have nevertheless been
voluntarily accepted and
implemented by more than 100
countries in their banking reforms.
The accord has been implemented
in one form or the other to comply
with these international regulatory
standards as they can provide
legitimacy to the country’s financial
market and banks.
However, it has been argued that
the adoption of Basel standards is
insufficient, especially since they fail
to consider institutional weak-
nesses in developing countries,
when they emphasise role of
internal ratings and supervision.
Supervisors are unlikely to be
completely independent where
banks are owned by powerful
business elements.
Historical Development of
Bank Reforms in Nigeria Prior
to the 2004 Reform
Reforms have been a regular
feature of the Nigerian banking
system and have been crafted in
various kinds of regulatory
frameworks. According to Oke
(1993), Nigerian banking regulatory
system developed initially in
response to financial crisis and other
historical, political, and economic
events. The period, 1892 to 1952,
was regarded as laissez-faire with
neither licensing requirement nor any
regulatory control on the
establishment and operation of
banks. However, the failure of many
banks and the attendant losses
suffered by depositors led to the
setting up of the Patton’s
Commission in 1948 to enquire into
the nature of banking in Nigeria with
a view to ascertaining the nature of
regulations and controls that should
be introduced to ensure stability of
banks.
The Patton’s Commission led to
the enactment of the banking
ordinance of 1952 with the following
provisions:
♦ Holding of a valid license
prior to the set up of a
banking business
♦ Laid down standards and
procedures for conducting
banking business
♦ Prescription of minimum
capital and reserve structure
for banks.
♦ Existing banks were given 3
years to comply with the
main provisions of the
ordinance.
Nevertheless, reforms introduced by
the Patton’s Commission could not
forestall the failure of about 17 new
indigenous banks that were
established in a rush between 1951
and 1954 on the unfounded rumour
that a pending piece of legislation
would inhibit the development of
indigenous banks. The massive
crash of banks in the period
profoundly shocked the Nigerian
banking public and led to loss of
confidence in the banks.
In order to deepen and strengthen
bank regulation, the CBN Act of 1958
and the banking ordinance of 1959
were introduced. The CBN Act of
1958 gave an apex bank status to
the Central Bank of Nigeria with
powers to control and supervise
Nigerian Banks, including
inspection of books, accounts and
other related affairs of the banks as
they affect their stability and
corporate governance.
By 1969, government saw the
need to further strengthen banking
regulation with the enactment of the
1969 Banking Act, which
consolidated all bank legislations
since 1952 and introduced some
important new provisions such as:
♦ Non-bank financial interme-
diaries like discount
houses, acceptance
houses and other financial
institutions were added
into the definition of bank.
♦ The minimum paid up
capital of commercial
banks was raised
♦ A licensed bank should not
allow it’s paid up capital
and statutory reserves to
fall below 10% of its
deposit liabilities
♦ Every licensed bank
should transfer 25% of
each year’s net profit to its
reserve fund, when the fund
is less than the paid up
capital. But 12.5% of each
years net profit should be
transferred to reserve fund
when the fund is equal to
or greater than the paid up
capital
♦ The maximum amount of
credit a commercial bank
may extend to each
customer was raised from
25% to 33.33% of the sum
of its paid up capital
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♦ In addition to specified liquid
assets, banks may be
asked to hold minimum
cash reserves, special
deposits and stabilisation
securities as specified by
the CBN
♦ No bank may open or close
office anywhere in and
outside Nigeria without the
consent in writing of the
CBN, and
♦ Prior approval must be





notwithstanding, there was still the
need to bring together in each of the
preceding laws the numerous
amendments and the desire of
government that the banking sector
act as a catalyst of economic
development of the country. Also, it
was the desire of government that
financial sector reforms should be
ongoing in order to engender healthy
competition and ensure market
efficiency. To achieve these desires,
the 1991 CBN act number 24 and
the Banks and other Financial
Institutions Act number 25 of 1991
were enacted. The aim was to
ensure that the CBN achieved
effective supervision of banks and
control of monetary policy, along
with adequate enforcement of
prudential regulations. The 1991
CBN act number 24 contains various
provisions for the use of market
based instruments for monetary
control and management as the
banks powers to obtain financial
information from and issue monetary
policy directives to economic agents
and financial institutions were
strengthened by the act.
In light of the foregoing, the
history of banking reforms in Nigeria
shows that variety of laws,
regulations and supervisory
practices introduced were usually
driven by perceived economic,
political and social challenges of the
times. As was the case with the
2005 reform, legislations were
introduced either as proactive
measures both to strengthen the
banking system and prevent
systemic crisis or in response to
the challenges posed by such
factors as systemic crisis,
deregulation, globalisation and
needs imposed by technological
innovation.
The Banking Sector Reforms
in 2004 and Beyond
Drawing from its powers under the
CBN Act of 1991 as amended, and
the Banks and Other Financial
Institutions Act of (BOFIA)1 1991 as
amended, the CBN anchored the
banking sector reform on a 13-point
agenda involving (CBN, 2005: 16)
Minimum bank capital base of N25
billion that must be met on or
before 31st December, 2005:
♦ Consolidation through
mergers and acquisition,
♦ risk-focused and rule-
based regulatory
framework,












♦ promotion of the
enforcement of dormant
laws
♦ to prevent non-performing
loans (NPLs) of the banking
system from posing a big
challenge to the restruc-
tured institutions, the CBN
initiated the establishment
of an Asset Management
Corporation (AMC), which
would purchase such NPLs.
 In this first phase of reform, the
former transaction and compliance
based supervisory approach of
banks in Nigeria was considered too
narrow in scope and uniformly
applied irrespective of the peculiar
nature of each supervised institution.
With the reform, an attempt was
made to adopt a robust, proactive and
sophisticated supervisory process,
which would essentially, be based on
risk profiling of emerging big banks
in line with the Basel Accord.
It was also expected that the
development of a web-based
information-tracking system
otherwise known as electronic
financial analysis and surveillance
system (eFASS) would greatly assist
the implementation of the intended
supervisory approach.
The second phase of the reform
tagged “market induced consoli-
dation”, was seen by Akingbola (
2006) as coming too late because
of the seeming complacency of sole
owners of the banks who were
content to be ‘local champions’. The
second phase has taken the form of
most banks raising additional funds
from the capital market to further beef
up their capital base in the quest for
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market dominance (BGL Ltd., 2007:
6).
In recent times, the CBN
introduced other measures to
strengthen the gains of the reforms
and minimise problems associated
with the global economic meltdown.
In the early part of 2008, the CBN
saw the need for a common year end
for banks and for the redenomination
of the Naira in order to strengthen
for eventual convergence as required
by the West African Monetary Union
and the drive for a common currency
in the West African Sub-region.
Unfortunately, the move was
thwarted by powerful interests who
were apprehensive of the
uncertainties surrounding the
proposed reforms; however, the
harsh realities of a plummeting naira
value in the face of an unrelenting
global economic meltdown forced
government to renege on its policy
of naira redenomination. With effect
from 31st December, 2009, it is now
mandatory that the annual financial
year of Nigerian banks should end
on the 31st of December. This move,
which was unanimously agreed to
by the Bankers’ Committee4, has
been seen as a drive to get Nigerian
banks to reinforce the position of
banks on full disclosure or compel
them to make full disclosure of their
exposures to risks if they are yet to
satisfactorily do so. In light of the
global economic crisis, the measure
is especially to encourage banks to
disclose their exposure to margin
facilities and other losses in the
wake of the financial crisis.
Disclosure is to be done through the
various channels of communication
open to the banks, such as annual
reports and facts behind the figures.
The issues of margin loans5 and
stability of exchange rate have also
been addressed by the CBN to
ensure continued soundness of
banks and overall macroeconomic
stability. In the wake of the global
meltdown, banks had to recall
margin loans to curtail exposures
that rose to 10 percent of banking
system credit towards the end of
2009. The recall, coupled with the
massive withdrawal of funds by
foreign institutional investors, led to
bearish trading and huge losses in
the Nigerian capital market. To ward
off derailment of gains of reform
which this development portended,
the CBN rolled out the following
measures (CBN: 2009):
♦ Reduction of the Monetary
Policy Rate (MPR- from
10.25 percent to 9.75
percent)
♦ Reduction in the Cash
Reserve Requirement
(CRR- from 4 percent to 2
percent)
♦ Reduction in the Liquidity
Ratio (LR- from 40 percent
to 30 percent)
♦ Directive to banks to explore
the option of restructuring
margin loans up to 31st
December, 2009
♦ Expansion lending facilities
to banks up to 360 days
♦  Introduction of an expanded
discount window facility6
♦ Suspension of liquidity mop-
up from September, 2008.
Furthermore, a Presidential Advisory
Team on Capital Market was set up
in August 2008 to brainstorm on
ways to reverse the dwindling
fortunes of the Nigerian capital
market, which is threatening other
segments of the financial sector. The
result of that move was the reduction
of fees by SEC, NSE and the other
regulatory authorities by 50 percent.
In particular, the NSE reviewed its
trading rules and regulations as
follows (CBN: 2009):
♦ Harmonisation of 1 percent
downward limit and 5 percent
upward limit in daily price
movement in the stock
market to 5 percent either
way, as from October, 2008
♦ Strict enforcement of NSE
listing requirements with
zero tolerance for infraction.
♦ Maximum share buy-back
limit of 15 percent
♦ Delisting of 19 moribund
companies.
The CBN also reintroduced the Retail
Dutch Auction System (RDAS) and
dropped the Whole Dutch Auction
System (WDAS) introduced in 2006.
This was done to eliminate some
observed market abuses and sharp
practices perpetrated by banks,
In the early part of
2008, the CBN saw the
need for a common year
end for banks and for
the redenomination of
the Naira in order to
strengthen for eventual
convergence as required
by the West African
Monetary Union and
the drive for a common
currency in the West
African Sub-region.
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strengthen market stability and
ensure strict adherence to foreign
exchange dealing rules. The WDAS
framework had allowed banks, as
authorized dealers, to buy foreign
exchange on their own and resell to
customers. But many banks round
tripped, engaging in various market
infractions. In the reintroduced
RDAS, banks buy foreign exchange
strictly on behalf of their customers,
thus checkmating speculative
arbitrage. Under the RDAS
framework, the following policies
became applicable:
♦ Management of the
exchange rate within a band
of +/-3 percent in the time
being,
♦ Difference between the CBN
buying and selling rates
shall not be more than 1%;
those of banks and the
Bureau de Change shall not
be more than 1 percent and
2 percent respectively
around the CBN rate.
♦ Irrespective of the source of
foreign exchange, the
authorised dealers should
buy strictly for their
customers and not for inter-
bank transaction.
The CBN has also appointed resident
bank examiners, which have been
posted to the banks along with the
introduction of a technological
interface (eFASS), to closely monitor
the banks and ensure they comply
with the requirement of timely
rendition of various reports.
Cost and Benefits of the 2004
Reforms
The 2004 banking sector reform has
come at great price to the banks, the
regulatory authorities and
government. The banks and the CBN
faced some tough reform challenges
such as skill redundancy following
the identification of duplicated skills
and expertise. Such categories of
staff were paid off in line with their
terms of engagement and best
practices in the industry. Others
included inexperience on large-scale
consolidation, non-performing loans
that were capable of distorting the
balance sheet of the consolidated
banks, problem of asset stripping,
and the enormous cost of
consolidation. The CBN had to
support some of the merged banks
to the tune of over N40 billion in debt
forbearance, in addition to the
enormous amount of time and energy
it had to put in to midwife the reform
to its logical conclusion. There was
general fear of the possibility of inflow
of toxic funds into the banking
system in the face of inadequate
supervisory capacity. Strong
government involvement in some
banks and its implication for
corporate governance in the
consolidated banks was also a
problem. Viewed from the
perspective of family ownership of
banks, the cost of reform included
huge dilution of or total loss of control.
On the other hand, it is evident
that strong capital base, coupled with
the adoption and effective
implementation of a code of sound
corporate governance in the industry
not only have impacted positively on
the operational ability of each bank
to continue as a going concern, but
also have stimulated growth in the
Nigerian economy. One of the
immediate benefits of the reform is
astronomic rise in aggregate
capitalisation of the Nigerian banking
system to N755 billion from N327
billion, prior to the introduction of
the consolidation programme. It is
reported (CBN: 2007, Sere-Ejembi,
2008) that the twenty five banks that
emerged from the consolidation
exercise attained mega status.
Their mega status is underscored
by the fact that they accounted for
93.5 percent of the deposit liabilities
of the entire banking system. At the
end of December 2007, all the
existing 24 banks met the required
minimum shareholders’ funds of
N25 billion. Viewed in terms of a
risk-weighted assets level of N8.2
trillion, the resultant total banks’
qualifying capital of N1.7 trillion
represented a capital adequacy ratio
(CAR) of 20.9 percent. This position
was regarded satisfactory by the
CBN, when compared to the
required minimum CAR of 10
percent.
Thus, the consolidation in the
Nigerian banking system promoted
the emergence of financial
conglomerates, engaged in cross-
border and cross-sector operations.
Nigerian banks have begun to
participate effectively in financing
One of the immediate
benefits of the reform is
astronomic rise in
aggregate capitalisation
of the Nigerian banking
system to N755 billion
from N327 billion, prior
to the introduction of the
consolidation
programme.
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large transactions and it is
expected that they would become
attractive to multinational
companies operating within the
commanding heights of  the
economy – Oil & Gas,
Telecommunications, Aviation, and
hence, help to meet their needs for
loan capital. The reform also led to
the raising of N406 billion from the
Nigerian capital market in the quest
to meet the minimum capital
requirement. However, only N360
billion of the N406 billion raised was
verified and accepted by the CBN.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
inflow as a result of the consolidation
came to a total of US$652 billion
and GBP162 thousand.
The financial indicators as at
end June 2007 showed that the GDP
increased from about N10.2 trillion
in 2004 to over N20.2 trillion in 2007,
with total assets of the banking
system, increasing from about
N3.21 trillion to over N8.39 trillion
within the same period. This implies
that total bank assets to GDP ratio
increased from 29.73 percent in
2004 to 39.2 percent as at June 30,
2007. In percentage terms, total
assets of the banking sector
increased, by 55.37 percent or
N3.73 trillion, from N6.74 trillion in
2006 to N10.47 trillion in 2007 as
shown in figure1.
In the same vein, shareholders’
funds of the banking system, which
was N327 billion as at end June,
2004 significantly rose to N1.085
trillion as at end June 2007. Using
profitability index, the total banking
system profitability increased from
N22 billion as at end June 2004 to
N68 billion as at end June 2007,
depicting an increase of over 209.09
percent. Also, aggregate deposits
in the banking sector rose from N2.5
trillion in 2005 to N5.4 trillion in 2007,
Figure 1:    Banking System
Source: CBN 2007 Annual Report.
Figure 2:    Banking System
Source: CBN 2007 Annual Report.
Figure 3:    Banking System
Figure 4
Source: CBN 2007 Annual Report.
Source: CBN 2007 Annual Report.
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a growth rate of 55.8 percent in 2007
as against 41.7 percent in 2005, as
indicated in figure 2.
Total bank credit growth rate was
82.7% in 2007 as against 30.4%
growth rate in 2005 as shown in
Figure 3.
The ratio of non-performing
credits to total credits fell from the
21.6 percent and 18.12 percent
respectively recorded in 2004and
2005, to the figure of 8.44 percent
recorded in 2007. Also, the cost
efficiency ratio7 for the banking
system was 65.9 percent in 2007
as against 39.97 percent in 2005
as indicted in figure 4.
Based on the foregoing positive
post banking sector consolidation
indices, it was not surprising when
the first ever Bank Systemic Risk
Report (BSRR) on the Nigerian
banking system issued at end of
September 2007 categorised
Nigeria under MPI ‘1’.8 The rating
indicated low potential vulnerability
of the banking system to systemic
stress. Other benefits of the
banking 2004 reform as reported by
the CBN (2007) include:
♦ Emergence of Larger
Banks with Potential for
Wider Branch Network:
The 89 banks in Nigeria as at
the end of May, 2005, had a total
of 3,382 branches. The
existence of a relatively few
number of bank branches has
grave implications for economic
development. Consolidation has
resulted in fewer but bigger
banks with large c a p i t a l
base, which has put great
pressure on the banks to embark
upon branch expansion.
♦ Greater Capability to
Partner Internationally:
Consolidation has strengthened
Nigerian banks such that the
quantum of international
commercial and financial
transactions that passed through
them has increased and more
banks now have greater access
to credit line from foreign banks.
♦ Predominance of Listed
Banks:
Almost all of the 25 banks which
emerged from the consolidation
are quoted on the stock
exchange. Not only has this
resulted in the dilution and wider
spread of ownership, it has also
reduced the presence of family-
owned and controlled banks with
its attendant insider abuses.
Without suggesting that the
existence of family controlled
banks or other controll ing
shareholders in a bank is in itself
inappropriate, I am of the view
that this development will have a




The CBN, during the consolidation
programme, released a draft code
of corporate governance for banks
in Nigeria to the industry and the
general public for their inputs. It
was expected that the code
would assist banks in enhancing
their corporate governance
frameworks. Similarly, it was
expected to assist regulators in
assessing the quality and
efficiency of those frameworks in
banks.
Post Reform Challenges and
the Lessons Learnt.
The Challenges
One of the challenges arising from
the 2004 banking reforms is the issue
of proper integration of the merging
parties. The emergence of large-
sized banks through mergers and
acquisitions posed challenges of
integration, acculturation, skil l
building, service delivery, and
boardroom and management
squabbles. There was thus, the need
to fashion out ways of fusing the
individual entities that came together
into coherent corporate entities and
tapping the synergies from the
mergers. A pervasive mind set has
been that 80 percent of mergers
usually fail to produce the desired
results; there was need to do away
with this entrenched mentality. A
strong corporate governance culture
in the emerged banks could be
enhanced through the issuance of
code of ethics for banks and
sustained periodic monitoring by the
CBN.
Another challenge, which the
reform sought to tackle, was how to
best raise Nigerian banks to the
position of global players. As noted
by Akingbola (2008), being a global
player goes beyond establishing
physical presence in key locations
internationally, to such critical issues
as adopting and conforming to best
practice in corporate governance,
upgrading operations in line with
international standards especially
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through the deployment of cutting-
edge information technology
infrastructure, and adopting best
practice in brand management such
that Nigerian banks do not appear
as mere satellites of their better
established international counter-
parts. According to Onodje and
Olaniyan (2008), Nigerian banks can
be globally competitive if aggressive
branding and re-branding strategies
are adopted, coupled with provision
of the right kind of legal environment
and enforcement of rules.
The management of stake-
holders’ expectation is a challenge
to the merged banks. As noted by
the CBN (2007) forecasts in banks’
prospectus for public issues during
the reform period, banks created high
shareholder expectations of bumper
dividend payments and capital
appreciation. Profit and dividend
payout motives, therefore, rose to
uncomfortable heights. The inability
of some banks to meet these
expectations in the short-run began
to create shareholder disaffection,
while there was undue pressure on
banks to out-perform one another
and pay unsustainable dividends as
promised during the consolidation
period.
Another challenge was how to
reduce the high overheads of most
banks, which had tend to hamper the
post consolidation gains, and
reduced credit cost to customers.
Indeed, the Manufacturers Associa-
tion of Nigeria has argued that the
big size of post consolidated banks
ought to reflect economies of scale
and low cost of capital, the existing
interest rate regime has not
supported the manufacturing sector.
Although, the CBN has always
pointed out that interest rates should
be market determined under a
deregulated regime, it is noteworthy
that regulatory authorities in the
United States and Europe have had
to cut interest rates several times
(some almost to zero level) to spur
demand, critical to investment and
growth. Thus, creative strategies
need to be devised to reduce credit
cost so as to unlock the immense
potentials of the real sector,
especially small scale businesses in
the informal sector. Ancillary to this
is reducing the prohibitive
transaction costs associated with
the capital markets and stripping
away the mind numbing bureaucracy
that hampers banking business
activity.
The need for continuous capacity
building and official support to
sustain and deepen the gains of the
reforms are also important
challenges to tackle. There is serious
skill shortage such as leadership,
risk management, operations, and
strategy and information technology.
To fill these important skill gaps,
effort should be directed at aggressive
search for and development of human
capital. The recent downward trend
of the Naira appears to negate earlier
post consolidation trend of
consistent macro-economic stability.
Creative ways would need to be
devised to sustain disciplined fiscal
management in the face of adverse
political pressures.
Some Lessons Learnt
There are various useful lessons
arising from the 2004 banking
reform, which if applied, will assist
the emergent banks to be stable,
strong and competitive locally and
globally. One lesson is that Nigerian
banks can only ignore good
corporate governance and be
myopic to their peril- there must be
transparency and accountability.
The boards of banks must be made
of people of credible character, who
are conversant with the nuances of
banking business. Bank
managements must look beyond
their shores and benchmark against
international best practices; in which
case, they cannot afford to be the
one-eyed king in the city of blind
men.
There must be legal backing in
form of up to date legislations to
empower enforcement of rules and
regulation. Banks must build
capacity and bring in new people
who would inject new blood and
ideas into the system as shown by
the entrance of Professor Soludo
into CBN. They must also diversify
shareholders’ base to attract low
cost capital and improve their
product pricing ability to remain
competitive. The reforms have also
demystified the notion that “small
is beautiful”. It is now evident that
the bigger the bank, the more stable
and competitive it will be. A big bank
will be able to withstand shocks
induced by internal and external
threats better.
Concluding Remarks
Banking reforms in Nigeria are not
new phenomena, as they date back
to colonial times. As has been
shown in the paper, there were
various reforms from 1952 to 1991,
before the last major reform effort in
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2004. These include those
introduced by the Patton’s
Commission in 1948, the CBN Act
of 1958 and the Banking Ordinance
of 1959, the 1969 Banking Act
which consolidated all bank
legislations since 1952 and
introduced new provisions,  and the
1991 CBN Act number 24 and the
Banks and Other Financial
Institutions Act number 25 of 1991,
which aimed to ensure that the CBN
achieved effective supervision of
banks and control of monetary
policy, along with adequate
enforcement of prudential
regulations.
What is evident is that the dept
of the reforms and their effect on the
economy increased at each stage.
The 2004 banking sector reform has
been especially viewed as an
economic miracle. This is because
the exercise has placed Nigerian
banks on the global financial market
with 5 Nigerian banks being rated
among the top 500 world wide.
Nigerian banks are now the main
visible transnational corporations
with branch networks in over 22
African and 5 OECD nations (CBN,
2009: 48).  However, the current
reform has not been without
challenges and costs; much has
been achieved in creating a solid
platform for the long awaited
appreciable and sustained impact of
the banking sector on the Nigerian
economy. Already, the CBN is looking
ahead to involving all stakeholders in
the Nigerian financial sector in the
match towards making Nigeria a
financial hub of the African continent
as articulated in the “Financial
System Strategy 2020” (FSS 2020)
document. The document is
expected to take the reform to the
next level from what Akingbola (2008)
called ‘vertical consolidation’ to
‘horizontal consolidation’, involving all
manner of financial service providers.
 Realising its pivotal role in the
development of the Nigerian financial
sector, the CBN took up the
challenge of leading the financial
sector regulators to bring about the
required regeneration of the sector to
make it stronger, more resilient and
capable of playing a more significant
role in boosting national
development, and making Nigeria the
financial hub of Africa. It came up with
a strategic blueprint tagged “Financial
System Strategy 2020” (FSS 2020),
which embodies a vision of creating
the safest and fastest growing
financial system among emerging
markets and the mission of driving
rapid and sustainable economic
growth in Nigeria and Africa.  The
objectives of FSS 2020 include the
following (Soludo: 2007, CBN 2007):
♦ development of a shared
vision and an integrated
strategy for the nation’s
financial system;
♦ development of market and
infrastructure strategies that
would align fully with the
strategic intent of the overall
system;
♦ creation of a performance
measurement framework and
evolution of a partnership of
all key stakeholders to
implement the strategy; and
♦ establishment of a
harmonious and collabo-rative
environment for the
development and delivery of
the strategy.
The future direction of the reform, as
enthused by Akingbola (2006), is a
move away from vertical integration
within the banking sector to a
horizontal integration across all
industries of the Nigerian financial
system. This is where the reform
journey appears to be heading in the
coming years, judging from the above
stated objectives in the FSS 2020. It
is therefore, the hopeful expectation
of ardent watchers of the reforms that
the journey takes all stakeholders to
the desired destination - a strong and
vibrant economy that is accorded due
regard and respect amongst the
comity of prosperous nations.
1 Mike A. Onodje is an Assistant Director, Macro Division, Economic Management Department, Centre for Management Development,
PMB, 21578, Ikeja, Lagos. Email: Mikeonodje@yahoo.com, Tel:2348054597905
2 The Financial Services Regulation Coordinating Committee (FSRCC) comprises the CBN, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
National Insurance Commission (NAICOM) and National Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC), National Pension commission (PENCOM),
amongst others. The CBN, in its pivotal role in the financial system, chairs FSRCC.
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3 The BOFIA 1991, as amended, brought the activities of a myriad of financial institutions- deposit money banks (DMBs), finance
companies, discount houses, primary mortgage institutions, bureau de change, community banks as well as the specialized non-
deposit taking banks (development finance institutions -DFIs)-  under the regulatory and supervisory control of the CBN.
4 The Bankers’ Committee comprises the managing directors/CEOs of banks including top members of the Central Bank of Nigeria
(CBN) and the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) and is chaired by the CBN Governor.
5A margin loan is credit granted to individuals, brokers and other capital market participants for the purchase of securities,
especially shares.
6 A discount window allows commercial banks discount treasury bills with the CBN to ameliorate liquidity challenges. The recent
inclusion of commercial papers and bankers acceptances as eligible traded instrument gave rise to an expanded discount
window. The expansion became necessary to obviate possible credit crunch in the banking system.
7 The cost efficiency ratio is a measure of the ratio of operating expenses to operating income
8 MPI 1 indicates Low Potential Vulnerability The assessment was based on three years annual data with a trigger in any of the
three years being relevant to a country’s MPI score. The three-year horizon was designed to be long enough to take account of
the time it could take for banking system stress to emerge.
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